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“Indeed, hope and optimism are critical components of the innocence that is the 
hallmark of America's engagement with the Middle East. Why would we bother to try 
to transform such a troubled region unless we somehow believed we could, and 
should? But the dark side of that innocence is a naïveté bred of ignorance and 
arrogance that generate a chronic inability to comprehend.” 
 
  7. p. Abroad,” “Innocent (2009). Indyk Martin 
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Abstract 
 
This study discusses the Obama Administration’s Policy toward the Palestinian- 
Israeli conflict from 2009 to 2017. It is an attempt to explain the change in the 
Administration’s approach to the peace process, and the reasons for its inability to 
achieve a breakthrough in resuming the negotiations between Palestinians and 
Israelis. Deploying the foreign policy analysis, the study explores the main drivers 
and outcomes of the American policy concerning the conflict, and explains its 
development over the eight years of Obama’s presidency that started with high 
expectations on resolving the conflict and ended with prevailing disappointment and 
fear of the end of the peace process itself.  
 
Keywords:  
Palestine; Israel; Foreign policy; Obama; The Peace Process; Conflict Resolution; 
Arab- Israeli Conflict; The Middle East.    
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I. Introduction 
 
In consistency with much of its legacy, Obama’s Administration policy Palestine/ 
Israel is highly indicative to decisive changes in the American policy in the Middle 
East and beyond. Whereas Obama started his tenure as a great believer in the peace 
process and the two state solution, showing great interest in solving the century-long 
conflict (Miller, 2010), he ended up with disappointment and rhetorical emphasis on 
the broad lines of the American vision of the conflict settlement (Thrall, 2017; Miller 
2015). 
For several observers (Thrall, 2016; Elgindy, 2016), Obama, unlike any of his 
predecessors, has no legacy regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For example, he 
did not introduce a comprehensive agreement between Israel and its neighbors like 
the one Carter (1977-1981) introduce. Nor did he put parameters of solution, like 
those of Clinton. Even his former predecessor, George W. Bush introduced the widely 
accepted formula for peace, the two-state solution. Although he is among the few 
American presidents who have a proper knowledge of the facts of the conflict and 
more balanced worldview of the complex relations between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors, Obama refrained from making any constructive plan to push the peace 
process forward, and the measures taken by his Administration have been merely 
diplomatic procedures without real content no matter what its direction. And John 
Kerry- the Secretary of State- fueled most of the short-lived efforts in 2013-2014.  
The case of the Obama Administration, therefore, requires a closer look at the 
reasons for this failure in brokering peace, and achieving considerable inroads, that a 
future solution can be built on. The study suggests that this failure can be explained 
by the interaction between two sets of factors; the ideational ones and the structural 
ones. By the former we means the norms and ideas that shaped Obama’s perceptions 
of the conflict; and by the latter we mean the effects of the established context in 
which the Obama Administration was operating; that included the chaotic security 
situation in the Middle East, and the nature of the US-Israeli relations during the 
Administration tenure.  The study also assumes that, the overwhelming effects of the 
those structures led to the downgrading of peace in Palestine as a primary item on the 
Administration’s agenda, and constrained its movement for peace over its two terms.       
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The study is an attempt to fill the gap left in the historiography of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict by providing an analytical narrative of the Obama Administration 
contribution to the peace process over the two-term tenure. While it aims at 
explaining the change of the American policy toward the conflict during that era, it is 
not meant to serve as a counterfactual history of the peace process. Rather, it seeks 
elaboration of the changes in the American role in relation to the shifts of ideas and 
the ongoing change of the American position in the region. By doing so, the study 
sheds light on the implications of these changes on the future of the peace process as a 
whole and the American role in it in particular, as legitimate doubts arise over both.          
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II. Background  
 
Two years before Obama took office as the new president of the USA in January 
2009, the peace process negotiations between the Israeli government and the 
Palestinian Authority were halted. However, the coming of the democratic president 
provided a new hope for both sides in resuming the peace process based on his profile 
as a knowledgeable ex-activist, and a president with a new approach and agenda with 
the Muslim world. In turning his promises of peace into a mission of peace, Obama 
adopted the American playbook of the peace process, with the two-state solution at its 
core (Thrall, 2016; Elgindy 2016; Pressman, 2016; Shlaim, 2016).  
 
The peace process was launched in the Madrid Conference in the 30th of 
October 1991 initiated by G. H. Bush Administration. Nevertheless, it did not manage 
to turn its outputs into solid basis for peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians, 
which was provided instead by the Norwegian government through the secret talks 
between the leftist Israeli government presided by Rabin and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO). These talks resulted in the Declaration of Principles 
or Oslo Peace Agreement in 1993 which has since then been the agreed upon 
referential framework of the peace process as it was recognized by the international 
community at large and adopted by the US government (Pan, 2005; USDS; BBC, 
2013).  
 
The primary breakthrough of the Oslo Agreement is that it created official 
mutual recognition between the two sides; whereas the PLO recognized the right of 
Israel in existence, the latter recognized the PLO as the representatives of Palestinians 
in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. Furthermore, the Agreement established 
the Palestinian Authority as a political and administrative body for the Palestinian 
people, and divided the control over the occupied territories between the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) until a final agreement is 
reached (Pan, 2005; BBC, 2013).   
 
The Oslo Accords set up issues to be negotiated as permanent status issues, 
which are Jerusalem, the borders, the refugees, the settlements, and water. The 
Accords state “It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, 
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including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations 
and co-operation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest." (Oslo 
Accords, 1993) 
 
Radicals on both sides opposed the Oslo accords: the Jihadist Islamists, and 
prominent figures within the PLO on the Palestinian side and the far-right wing 
Zionists on the Israeli side. Slow progress was achieved through the US-sponsored 
negotiations, especially following the assassination of Rabin in 1995. The Oslo 
Accords proved to be based on shaky grounds particularly because of the PA failure 
in consolidating its legitimacy among the Palestinians, and the collapse of Camp 
David talks between Arafat and Barak in 2000 (BBC, 2013). The disappointment 
among Palestinians reached its peak in the second intifada (uprising) that erupted by 
Ariel Sharon visit to Al Haram Alsharif- a deliberate act from the Israeli hawkish 
figure to subvert what he believed Barak promised Arafat in Camp David- The 
Palestinian Intifada was characterized by the eruption of violence and resulted in an 
actual end of the peace process and Sharon's reinvasion of the West Bank to liquidate 
Arafat's authority. 
 
Towards the end of his presidency, the Democrat president Bill Clinton 
declared his parameters for the resolution to the conflict, offering a plan to deal with 
the most protracted issues of negotiations. They were approved in the Taba Summit in 
January 2001 in which the idea of the land swaps was the first introduced. In light of 
violence in the Palestinian occupied territories and the massive civilian losses among 
Palestinians, the Arab states led by Saudi Arabia adopted the Arab Peace Initiative in 
March 2002, according to which Israel was asked to withdraw from all the occupied 
Arab territories, and the refugees were given the right to return or to be compensated. 
Consequently, the Arab Countries affirm that the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and 
would enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states 
of the region, and would establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this 
comprehensive peace.  (Pan, 2005; BBC, 2013).     
 
The George W. Bush Administration adopted Clinton Parameters. Moreover, 
it endorsed the two-state solution, as Bush proposed the creation of a “peaceful and 
democratic Palestinian State” alongside Israel in June 2002. However, excluding 
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Arafat, Bush set reforming the PA, dismantling the militant groups, and electing a 
new leader as conditions for resuming the peace talks based on the two-state solution. 
Moreover, the Bush Administration engaged its efforts into the International Quartet 
that composed of the US, the EU, the UN and Russia, which initiated the Road Map 
on 19 November 2003 in the form of the UNSC 1515 (Mohamed, 2015; Otterman, 
2005).  
 
Based on Bush’s endorsement of the two-state solution, the Road Map 
proposed a phased timetable, highlighting the establishment of security before a 
permanent settlement (Mohamed, 2015). It is designed to create confidence-building 
measures, leading to final status talks. The Road Map paved the way to the peace 
talks in Annapolis Conference in 2007 in which the two parties, headed by Olmert 
and Mahmoud Abbas, agreed on the current formulation of the two-state solution. 
Moreover, a joint understanding was issued according to which both parties were to 
engage in talks until the end of 2008 reaches a full peace deal. The talks came to a 
dramatic halt when a military confrontation took place between the IDF and Hamas in 
Gaza strip, the end of Olmert's term in office in 2009, and the coming of the right-
wing government of Netanyahu that has been adherent to the settler policy (BBC, 
2013). 
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III. The Theoretical Framework 
 
a.   The Research Questions  
 
The primary goal of the study is to attempt the question: what are the reasons for the 
failure of the Obama Administration in brokering peace between the two parties of the 
conflict.  
 
Specific research questions: 
 
1. How did the Obama Administration approach the conflict over its tenure?   
2. How did the Administration’s perception of the conflict and the peace process 
change during its two-term tenure?  
3. What was the role of norms and ideas in shaping Obama’s policy? 
4. To which extent did the post 2011 security situation in the Middle East affect 
the Administration’s policy toward the conflict? 
5. To what extent did the established US-Israeli relations affect the 
Administration’s choices for peace?     
 
b. Conceptual Framework 
 
At large the study draws on the debate between the neo realist (structuralist) and the 
constructivist perspectives of international politics (see Wendt 1987). This debate can 
be cited as the agent-structure problem in the international relations theory. This 
debate illustrates the interactive relationship between the individual actors (policy 
makers) within the state, as the primary actor in international politics, and the 
structure of the system that constitutes the objective setting of relations, distribution 
of power and factual context that actors (agents) are performing within. This debate 
can be summarized as follows:   
 
• The Neo-realists (structuralists) empathize on the role of structure in dictating 
the behavior in international politics. By “structure” they mean the way the 
units are ordered in relation to one another (Cepik and Brancher 2017, 157). 
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According to this definition, the world system has several structures where the 
distribution of power is relative and shaped by various factors. But for 
Kenneth Waltz, the main theorist of neo-realism in seminal work A Theory of 
International Politics (1979), anarchy is the main structure of the world 
system. There is no central authority. In this ontologically anarchic position, 
states are seeking survival through advancing their national interests. Yet 
national interests are defined by the interaction of the domestic actors since 
the state is not a coherent unit (Whyte (2012; Jacobsen 2013).  
• The constructivists, on the contrary, stress the social, ideational and inter-
subjective character of world politics (Behravish, 2011). They agree on the 
importance of structure, especially anarchy, yet they emphasize the role of 
perception in shaping the impact of anarchy. As Alexander Wendt (1998) put 
it “Anarchy is what states make of it.” 
• Hence, structures and national interests are not predetermined factors, they are 
being “constructed” in the process of interaction between the agents and the 
factual context, and This agency is shaped by the actors’ norms, values, ideas, 
self-perceptions and identities;  
• Therefore, neither the structure nor the agent’s perceptions are static; they 
change in the course of interaction (Katzenstein in Theys 2017, 39). 
 
The study assumes that Obama’s policy regarding the conflict was the product of this 
interaction between notions and the impact structures. Obama, as an agent, and his 
administration, developed some notions of the conflict before and during their tenure. 
While the administration tried in several occasions to act actively to broker peace, 
motivated by the centrality of peace to the American national interest, it was defied by 
the chaotic security situation in the Middle East, which redefined the American 
national interest in the region, and the relationship between the US and Israel. Both 
factors represented a specific dynamic setting of power relations that shaped the 
agents’ perceptions and preferences.    
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c. Methodology   
 
In answering the research questions, the study uses qualitatively correlated methods, 
foreign policy analysis and the comparative historical analysis. 
  
1. Foreign policy analysis:  a method with several models. For the purpose of 
this study, our analysis is going to deploy discourse analysis and the model of 
bureaucratic politics.   
 
a) Discourse Analysis: this tool is primarily a constructivist approach used to 
analyze the perceptions of policy-makers regarding specific issues or 
structures. It assumes that when the policy maker repeats some ideas in 
several settings to different audiences, then they are trying to persuade the 
interlocutors of their positions. It also presumes that these policy makers are 
not using language in different settings as a smokescreen to hide to their 
obscure real intentions (Daddo, 2015).            
  
b) The Bureaucratic Politics Model: it fits both the neo-realist and 
constructivist perspectives, since it perceives the state as a framework of non-
unitary bureaucratic bodies whose interactions define its foreign policy. In 
addition to the emphasis on the nature of the political system and its social 
and economic domestic environment, this model assumes that “foreign policy 
decisions are the result of a rational process in which the various agencies, 
departments, and offices that collectively constitute the government jointly 
serve an agreed-upon national interest.” (Breuning, 2007, p. 95) 
 
Applying these two models to the American foreign policy during the Obama 
Administration, the study will focus on analyzing the discourse of President Obama, 
the Administration’s officials, and the peace process officials such as the special 
envoys to the Middle East, the secretaries of State and others in order to assess their 
perceptions, and most importantly, show how they were reflected in the 
Administration’s attitude that is defined by the interaction between various domestic 
and foreign structures.   
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2. Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA): One of the primary goals of the 
study is to build a historical narrative of the Obama Administration’s legacy 
on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It will deploy CHA to build its narrative.  
 
As explained by Neuman (2006) the CHA, as an interpretive tool, “tries to see 
through the eyes of those being studied, reconstructs the lives of the people studied, 
and examines particular individuals or groups.” (p. 423). Therefore, it mainly uses the 
materials that can express the subjects of the study; that are the pieces of evidence left 
by them. By using the CHA, the researcher can collect available evidence of the 
subject matter, interpret them through reading their spatial-temporary context, and 
then reconstruct the past as a process of development. 
 
Historical evidences according to the CHA are primary and secondary sources; 
the primary sources refer to the data about the events and the topic of study used 
during the past period such as documents, letters, statements and speeches. The 
secondary sources refer to the writings of specialist historians who have invested 
years studying primary sources. 
     
In our case, policy makers of the American foreign policy in general and toward 
the Palestinian Israeli conflict in particular are the main individuals and groups on 
whom the CHA will be applied. Fortunately, there are plenty of primary sources 
produced by these actors during the Obama presidency such as the official speeches, 
TV and journalist interviews, statements, the UN resolutions and press releases, 
minutes of meetings, etc. However, it could be late for other primary sources to be 
written or released such the policy maker’s memoirs. As for the secondary sources, 
examples are specialists, commentators, analysts, and journalists.     
 
Following the steps of the CHA, the study uses the chosen conceptual framework 
of the American foreign policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a departure 
point, evaluate the available primary and secondary sources, organize data in a 
thematic order and synthesize the data reaching an explanatory narrative on the 
subject matter.               
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Hence, combining the models of the Foreign Policy Analysis and the CHA can 
assist the study to provide an explanatory and critically descriptive account on 
Obama’s Administration policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In its first part, 
the study will start by tracking the development of Obama’s ideas on the conflict 
before his inauguration and how this was reflected in the framework of initiatives 
proposed during the first phase of his presidency. In the second part, it will focus on 
the effects of the US-Israeli relations and how the restructure of the US position in the 
Middle East affected the Administration’s attitude toward the conflict. To highlight 
the interaction between these perceptions and structures, the study will examine the 
UNSC 2334 resolution. Finally, the study will make use of the implications of 
Obama’s peace failure to address the future of the peace process and the American 
role in deriving it.  
 
d. Literature Review  
 
So far, few studies have focused on the Obama Administration's policy toward the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, this does not negate the fact that there are 
numerous accounts on this subject matter from various perspectives and angles 
including scholarly papers, opinion pieces, book chapters and others. Most of the so-
far published pieces do not cover the whole era; rather, they tackle specific phases or 
events of the peace process during Obama’s Administration. While most of these 
accounts agree on the fact that its legacy concerning the conflict is poor and failed to 
make progress in pushing the peace process forward (Thrall, 2016; Thrall, 2017; 
Elgindy, 2016; Norman, 2016; Khalidi, 2013; Scham, 2014; Pressman, 2016; 
Shabaneh, 2015; Shlaim, 2017; Ruebner, 2013; Ruebner 2016), they do not offer an 
explanatory model in dealing with the reasons of failure. In tackling the ideational and 
structural factors that motivated and thwarted the Administration’s efforts for peace, 
several accounts provide valuable antidotes to explore the mindsets of Obama and his 
peace operatives, and the structures in which they acted.  
  
The first phase of the Obama presidency was a promising beginning for 
resolving the conflict. There were several reasons for the high expectation from the 
new president, including Obama’s familiarity with the facts of the conflict. According 
to Thrall (2016) and Ruebner (2016), Obama is the most well informed American 
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president about the facts of the conflict, even before his inauguration. However, 
Rashid Khalidi’s firsthand account as an ex-friend and a so-called detractor of 
Obama, suggests that this knowledge was restricted to the sphere of local politics and 
limited interactions with the Arab communities in Illinois. Kahlidi, in fact, 
underestimates the effect of this knowledge; whereas he argues that Obama was 
exposed more to pro-Israeli influence as he entered the national electoral politics 
(Khalidi, 2013). An earlier firsthand account written by the American Palestinian 
activist Ali Abunimah (2007) proves this gradual change of Obama, turning toward 
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) politics. He attributed it to 
the structure of the American electoral politics and the influence of the Jewish lobby.  
 
Upon handling the cause, Obama was under the spell of ideational structures 
that were deeply embedded in the establishment. In fact, the Administration was 
willing to resolve the conflict that gained urgency, believing that the foreseen was in 
the best interest of the US. Aaron David Miller (2010) and Thrall (2017) give 
eloquent description of these structures and their perception of the American national 
interest. Miller argues that the peace process had developed as a creed within the 
ranks and file of the state department and the White House (pp. 50-59). On the other 
hand, Thrall suggests that the terrain was more complex. He divided the US officials 
involved in the peace process into three distinct groups according to their perceptions 
of the conflict and its settlements: the skeptics, the reproachers and the embracers. 
Believing in the necessity of peace and the US role, Obama was swinging between the 
last two groups that dominated his negotiating team across his two terms (pp. 196-
204). 
 
Obama and his officials’ statement and speeches are instructive in explaining 
the change of their perception of the conflict and the peace process over the two 
terms. In fact, the sympathetic and relatively balanced tone of Obama speeches was a 
reason for the high expectations in the peace camp, where Obama was expected to act 
in an innovative way to resolve the stalemate. However as a president, Obama 
adopted a familiar approach to the conflict, largely drawn from the same playbook of 
his predecessor’s Administrations (Khalidi, 2013; pressman, 2016). Therefore, 
Obama’s policy was based on adopting the two-state solution, arranging high-level 
diplomatic efforts and appointing a special envoy for peace to the region. But these 
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conventional efforts had not achieved any breakthrough in brokering the peace 
between Palestinians and Israelis, and the first few months of Obama’s 
Administration’s efforts led to disappointment for the Palestinians and disquiet among 
Israelis (Fildman & Shikaki, 2009). 
 
In their analysis of Obama's record in peacemaking in the Middle East, Thrall 
(2016) and Elgendy (2016) suggest that Obama, unlike his predecessors, is the only 
American president who does not have any considerable achievement in the peace 
process, and his only legacy could be its death. However, they do not explain this 
failure. On the contrary, Rashid Khalidi (2013) briefly argues that it was beyond 
Obama’s reach to revive the peace process for reasons related to change in the 
makeup of the Congress after the midterm elections in 2009 for the republicans, the 
coming of Netanyahu’s settler movement in Israel, and the restructure of the security 
agenda in the Middle East after the 2011 uprisings toward containing Iran’s influence 
(p. 96). Furthermore, the bureaucratic politics was a factor in minimizing the 
possibilities of the foreseen settlement. Khalidi (2013) and Thrall (2017) saw 
Obama’s decision to turn to the more pro-Israeli officials such as Dennis Ross as a 
setback. 
 
Similarly, Shabaneh (2015) argues that the main reason for Obama's poor 
legacy in the peace process was his failure to use what he calls "smart power". He 
argues that Obama's policy was characterized by the reluctance to use diplomatic, 
cultural, legal, economic, and moral tools to end the Palestinian- Israeli conflict 
(Shabaneh, p. 6). In spite of the repertoire of the peace measures left by the former US 
presidents, Obama- especially in his second term- reluctantly used the least of them. 
As he was approaching the end of his presidency, he had not declared parameters to 
outline his stance concerning the conflict similar to what Clinton did in 2000 
(Elgindy, 2016). Moreover, he did not declare the symbolic recognition of the state of 
Palestine, nor condemned the illegal Israeli occupation and settlements, by restoring 
to the UN Security Council (Thrall, 2016). Criticizing Obama's policy and urging his 
Administration to take last-minute steps, these two accounts do not explain the efforts 
carried out by John Kerry in 2014 and the initial attempts of Obama in resolving the 
conflict at the beginning of his presidency.  
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In fact, Obama’s policy toward the conflict was carried out within a set of 
domestic and external structures. This study tends to focus on two structures, the 
chaotic security situation in the Middle East and its implications for the US in the 
aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, and the established Israeli-US relations. As for the 
former structure, several studies refer to it- even briefly- as a main reason for the 
failure of brokering peace (see Khalidi, 2013 p. 97; Scham, 2014). According to Ross 
and Jeffery (2013, p. 27), it was even harder for any US Administration to achieve 
peace advance while the region was overwhelmed with the rise of Islamist 
movements, civil wars, the looming collapse in Syria and the nuclear imbroglio of 
Iran, as these factors deepened disbelief in peace among the parties. Furthermore, this 
endangering environment changed the priority of the conflict and the urgency of 
making peace for the Administration over its tenure, especially in the second term 
(Jervis, 2017). But the most important implication of chaos, according to Scham 
(2014), is that in this unprecedented complexity, it was very hard for the United States 
to find a "good guy" to rely on in resolving the conflict "but currently every potential 
"good guy" is allied with some "bad guys".      
 
However, the Obama Administration not only was a receiver of these 
deteriorating environment, but also contributed to it. Leslie Gelb’s assessment of 
Obama’s foreign policy (2012, pp. 18-28) suggests that it was full of constrictions and 
inconsistencies, and lacked strategic vision in dealing with topics including the 
Middle East and Palestine. Similarly, Karsh (2016) argues that Obama’s delusion-
based policy was more obvious in the Middle East. He maintains that this policy is to 
be blamed for promoting Iran’s regional hegemony, driving Iraq and Libya to the 
verge of disintegration, expediting the surge of Islamist terrorism, exacerbating the 
Syrian civil war and making the prolonged Palestinian-Israeli conflict almost 
irreversible (p. 1). 
 
As for the US-Israeli relations, it is a common element between several 
analyses to assume that it was a primary reason for peace failure, yet in different ways 
(see Khalidi, 2013; Thrall, 2016; Ruebner, 2016). In fact, this structure reflects the 
blurring lines between domestic and foreign policy, where the Jewish lobby is a major 
player in dictating the US’s peace policy. For example, Scham (2014) contends that 
the domestic dynamics within the American political community play a major role in 
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preventing Obama’s Administration from pursuing any pressure on the right-wing 
Israeli government in the peace process, in spite of the fact that the Jewish community 
has grown more divided on Israel than ever before.  
 
Blackwill and Gordon (2016) provide a thorough analysis of the Israeli-US 
relations under the Obama Administration. They point out to the bad chemistry 
between Obama and Netanyahu as a main reason for the American-Israeli 
disagreements over many issues, including Iran, the democratic change in the Middle 
East and the Palestinian issue. They also think that there are structural changes within 
both the American and Israeli societies that have led to the US-Israel divergence, and 
accordingly the failure of the peace process. Whereas the American society is 
witnessing considerable leaning against the Israeli policies especially among the 
youth, the Israeli society is growing more conservative and hawkish (p 15-21).  
 
However, these structural changes did not reach the level of influence of the 
Israeli lobby on the Administration’s policy.  This was clear in the huge military aid 
that Obama secured for Tel Aviv (Shlaim, 2017; Blackwill and Gordon, 2016) 
According to Shlaim; Obama was the most supportive US president to Israel, in spite 
of the bad blood between him and Netanyahu. Furthermore, several accounts refer, 
yet briefly, to the way that Netanyahu used the increasingly deteriorating security 
situation in the Middle East and the rise of the Iranian influence to put pressures on 
the Administration through the AIPAC in order to take harsher measures against Iran 
to prevent the Administration from pushing Israel toward any negotiations with the 
Palestinians (Khalidi, 2013; Thrall, 2016).  
 
Therefore, while some of the literature point to the Administration’s mistakes 
in brokering peace, it was clear that it acted in very complex and unhelpful structures 
of domestic politics and regional security situation where the US, under Obama, 
started to reposition its role as a hegemon power and the only broker of peace. Most 
of the existing accounts do not explain the relationship between the changes in these 
structures and the change of its perception of the conflict and the American national 
interest in solving it. This research aims at clarifying this relation over the two terms 
of the Administration.    
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IV. The Ideational Factors 
a. The Development of Obama’s Perception of the Conflict 
 
During the US 2008, and after the victory of Barack Obama, many conflicting 
expectations surrounded his foreseen attitude towards the Middle East, especially in 
regards to the Palestinian question. Many Arabs and Arab Americans expected from 
Obama a just and evenhanded resolution to the century long conflict. They hoped for 
an agreement, which could achieve peace and security for both the Palestinians and 
the Israelis. It is difficult to fathom the role of Obama’s rhetoric regarding Palestine 
and the conflict in raising the bar of expectations of several constituencies within and 
outside the United States. Obama did not stick to a single well-defined perception and 
position toward the conflict. As a politician in a highly dynamic political ecosystem, 
his ideas evolved even before assuming his White House office.  
 
It is safe to say that Obama’s initial take on the conflict was sympathetic to the 
plight of the Palestinian people as a democratic left who descends from a long 
tradition of civil rights activism. According to Thrall (2017, 211) Obama could draw 
parallels with Britain colonization of Kenya, where his Muslim father came, and the 
African American struggle for civil rights that dominated a great deal of his political 
stance especially regarding the domestic affairs until his last days in presidency. 
Gregory Orfalea (2008, 730) suggests that Obama’s activism and his legal educational 
background, affected his advocacy for the rights of the Arab Americans, especially 
after the Patriot Act. For Orfalea, this advocacy that extended to the Palestine 
question to some degree was natural, given the ties between the Black American and 
Arabs and effects of long-seated discrimination against the two disenfranchised 
groups.  
 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Obama built considerably strong ties 
with number of the Palestinian American Activists and the Arab American 
communities. For example he attended lectures by renowned figures like Edward 
Said, one of the eloquent harsh critics of Oslo peace accords and the Peace Process 
(Thrall 2017, 210). In 2003, He described the opinions of professor Rashid Khalidi, 
  
21 
the celebrated Palestinian American historian, saying: “consistent reminders to me of 
my own biases and my own blind spots” (Orfalea, 731). Reportedly, Obama also 
accepted fundraising and services grant from Khalidi and his wife during his electoral 
camping for the Senate’s elections in 2000. Khalidi was well known as moderate 
Palestinian intellectual who denounced violence and advocated the two state’s 
solution.  
 
Against this background, Obama appeared to be more supportive to the 
Palestinian cause, and maybe one of the few deeply informed about it. During this 
time, Obama harshly rebuked the American Policy in the Middle East and called for a 
more even-handed approach toward Israel (Thrall 2017, 210) Nevertheless, his stance 
become more nuanced of the Israeli and American Jewish sensitivities, as he moved 
from Illinois politics to the national scene as early as 2002 (Abunimah, 2007). For 
example, he was reported in Forward magazine, a neo conservative pro- Israeli 
publication, to have courted the pro-Israeli constituency. Moreover, in 2004, he 
cosponsored an amendment that allowed the Illinois government to lend the state of 
Israel. (Abunimah 2007) 
 
Running again for the democratic nomination for the US Senate seat, which he 
triumphed, Obama refrained from any anti-Israeli comments, deliberately ignoring the 
Palestinian cause (Orfalea 2008). According to the Palestinian American activist Ali 
Abunimah, Obama explained this by saying: “I haven't said more about Palestine 
right now, [because] we are in a tough primary race. I'm hoping when things calm 
down I can be more up front." (Abunimah 2007) By stating this opinion, it was clear 
that Obama decided to distance himself from the activist legacy to embrace a more 
realistic and calculated position, which targets the electoral votes of the American 
Jews and the pro-Israeli constituency.  
 
This position resembled those views of the establishment regarding the 
conflict. For example, during his First visit to the West Bank and Israel as a US 
Senator in January 2006, he was asked by a Palestinian Student about his opinion of 
the Israeli “Berlin Wall” (i.e. the wall separating Israeli and the West Bank), to which 
Obama responded by asserting that the US is supporting the two state states of Israel 
and Palestine and the question that matter was how to get there (Orfalea, 717). 
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Furthermore, during the Second Lebanon War (July –August 2006) between the IDF 
and Hizbullah, Obama stance was not far different from that of the Bush 
Administration. He accepted the Israeli narrative of the conflict and saw its aggression 
as an exercise of its right of self-defense (Abunimah 2007). According to the 
American critic Noam Chomsky, Obama as a senator co-sponsored a Senate 
resolution calling the United States do nothing to impede IDF military actions until 
they had achieved their objectives and censuring Iran and Syria because they were 
supporting resistance to Israel” (Engelhard 2013). On the Palestinian front, he 
opposed the national government unity between Fatah and Hamas, calling for more 
isolation of the latter Islamist group until it meets the conditions of the Quartet  
(Abunimah 2007).  
 
Running for the presidency in 2007, Obama had become much closer to the 
Bush Administration’s position of the conflict. Addressing the American Israeli 
Public Relations Committee (AIPAC) in June 2008, Obama asserted he would never 
compromise when it came to Israel’s security, and Israel would not be forced to the 
negotiating table to discuss any agreement, which could compromise its identity as a 
Jewish state with recognized and defendable borders. Moreover, he emphasized that 
Hamas, as a terrorist group, would be denied of participation in any dialogue, until it 
renounces terrorism and recognizes Israel’s right to exit, reiterating the American 
commitment to defend Israel security and curb any threat to it from any hostile parties 
in the region from Gaza to Tehran (Obama speech, June 2008). Through claiming 
such position, Obama became much closer to the official standing of the 
establishment towards Israel. The power of the Jewish Lobby can easily reflect this 
change, as their support was imperative for winning the votes of large American 
constituencies (Abunimah 2007; Orfalea 2008). 
 
However, on some occasions, Obama expressed some activist’s sympathy 
with the plight of the Palestinians, by taking what can be called sympathetic realist 
position. This was clear in the First Gaza war December 2008-January 2009, also 
known as the Operation Cast Lead, which ended just few days before his 
inauguration. During the conflict, Obama refrained from criticizing the Israeli 
aggression, which claimed the lives of 1,400 Palestinians (Black 2009). His 
comments highlighted “substantial suffering and humanitarian needs in Gaza. Our 
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hearts go out to Palestinian civilians who are in need of immediate food, clean water, 
and basic medical care, and who’ve faced suffocating poverty for far too long.” He 
emphasized the need to lift the blockade imposed by Israel on the Gaza strip stating, 
“As part of a lasting cease-fire, Gaza’s border crossings should be open to allow the 
flow of aid and commerce.” (Cited in Ruebner 2016).  
 
Consequently, it appears that Obama did not construct a cohesive vision of the 
conflict before his election to presidency. Rather, his vision evolved gradually from 
activism to realpolitik as he was approaching the establishment until he assumed its 
top position in January 2009. This claim does not negate the effects of his activist 
legacy, but it suggests that it was knitted into a more realistic and domestically 
defined approach towards the conflict. This legacy and what it subsumed as sympathy 
with Palestinians did not dominate his policies especially in his first term. One might 
argue that two different ideas affected his Israel/Palestine policy, the need for 
reconciliation with the Muslim world and the “Peace Process” as a deep-seated norm 
with the American establishment.  
 
1) The reconciliation with the Muslim World: Obama was fully aware of the 
deteriorating legacy that Bush Administration inflicted on the relationship 
between the US and the Muslim World. Since the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, these relations were characterized by the invasion and the destruction 
of the US and its allies to two Muslim countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, 
threatening to invade others, and supporting the right-wing successive 
government of Israel against the Palestinians and other Arab nations, 
particularly in their aggressions against Lebanon and Gaza under the name of 
fighting Islamic terrorism and forced democratization, in addition to inciting 
Islamophobia in the US and Europe (See Wolffe 2016; Fleischhauer 2011; 
Katz 2010).  
 
Distancing himself from this problematic legacy, which endangered the US 
national interests and its relations with the Middle Eastern, allies, Obama, in his 
inauguration speech promised, “a new beginning” with the Muslim World. As he put 
it, “To the Muslim world, we seek a new way forward based on mutual interest and 
mutual respect (Obama 2009). According to some commentators, this novel approach 
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reflected Obama’s worldview where he perceived the Muslim world as a large 
coherent community, which can be addressed and accommodated. He identified 
himself as a linking bridge between the West and the Muslim world to which his 
father belonged and lived for several years (Oren 2015). These beliefs made Obama 
aware of the fact that the grievances caused primarily by the American policy 
particularly in the Middle East are related to each other. For example, Orfalea (2008, 
727-728) argued that it was the Iraq war that foretold Obama principled stance on 
Palestine/ Israel. Obama opposed this war since it started on the basis of its illegality 
and its irrelevance to fight terrorism (Ibid, 728).  According to Orfalea, Obama had 
suspicious feelings towards the unanimous support behind this war among the 
American Zionist lobby1, AIPAC in particular, and the neo-conservative politicians 
and the Israeli government (Ibid, 728). For Obama, this catastrophic war was 
indicative of the incompetency of the U.S Middle Eastern Diplomacy under the Bush 
Administration. He, instead proposed a direct, real and sustained diplomacy without 
preconditions. Orfalea thought that new approach might have led to a greater initiative 
in the Holy Land, through including the outside actors that have leverage on the final 
settlements in Palestine such as Hizbullah, Iran and Syria (Ibid, 729).   
 
The connection, which Orfalea tried to build in his account, became more evident 
in Obama’s speech to the Muslim world in June 2009. This speech was meant to be 
part of Obama’s new approach to the Muslim World as he spoke to the Arabs and 
Muslims of the world directly (Hamid 2017). In the speech, Palestine appeared as the 
second source of tension between the US and the Muslim communities after the Iraq 
war, which he portrayed as an illegal war of choice (Obama 2009). While asserting 
that the bond between the US and Israel was unbreakable, he emphasized, “it is also 
undeniable that the Palestinian people – Muslims and Christians – have suffered in 
pursuit of a homeland. For more than sixty years they have endured the pain of 
dislocation” (Ibid), “America,” he declared, will not turn our backs on the legitimate 
Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own.” And the only 
way to break the stalemate for the two peoples is through two states, where Israelis 
 
1 For more details on the role of the Jewish lobby in the Iraq war, see Stephen Walt & John 
Mearsheimer (2007). The Israel Lobby and the U.S. Foreign Policy. USA: Frrar, Starus and Giroux.    
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and Palestinians each live in peace and security […] That is in Israel's interest, 
Palestine's interest, America's interest, and the world's interest.” (Ibid)  
 
Alluding to his approach to the resolution, Obama highlighted his multilateral 
diplomacy in which all the parties including the Arab countries had a role to perform 
beyond drafting peace initiatives. According to several commentators, Obama’s 
remarks were and [remained] the most sympathetic by an U.S. president on Israel’s 
dispossession of Palestinians (Ruebner 2016). It was striking in its clarity and 
criticisms of the Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank as the primary obstacle to 
peace (Oren 2015). Nevertheless, it was not only about Palestine, it was to recast the 
whole American foreign policy with a major part of the world, Muslim countries. As 
Obama chose to pursue his predecessor policy in Afghanistan, where he saw it as a 
war of choice, and to pull the American troops from Iraq, the process that was 
completed in 2011. The Palestinian cause was the only source of tension that gained 
urgency and he had to start quickly to deal with it.  
 
2) Peace Process and the American National Interest: As the Cairo speech 
alluded to, achieving peace in Palestine/ Israel was a national interest of the 
US and all the involved. In fact, this belief was well established within the 
American Foreign policy institutions since the first Washington brokered 
peace agreement between Israel and Arab parties in the 1970s. The American 
veteran diplomat Aaron David Miller (2010, 50-59) depicts this normative 
belief to what he named as an official creed among the American diplomacy. 
Miller argued that the peace process had become a dogmatic creed with 
immutable principles dominating both the State Department and the White 
House. This creed, Miller maintains, is based on based on three teachings; 
first, pursuit of comprehensive peace was a core, if not the core, the American 
interest in the region, and achieving it secured the only way to maintain the 
American interests; second, peace can be only achieved through a serious 
negotiating process based on trading land for peace; and third, only the U.S. 
could help the Arabs and the Israelis to bring about this peace (ibid, 51).  
 
Miller argues that these three tents that drove all the U.S. presidents since the 
1970s, with considerable exception of George W. Bush and Ronald Regan who at 
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some points succumbed to them and proposed some peace initiatives, had turned out 
to be durable and bipartisan. Furthermore, they were fully embraced by whom he 
called the high priests of national security including the State departments veterans, 
like himself, intelligence analysts and most of the U.S. foreign policy senior officials 
and experts (Ibid, 51-52). Obama, according to Miller, was a zealous believer in this 
foreign policy creed; he had converted very early even before getting into the White 
House (Ibid, 52).  
 
Portraying a more nuanced picture of the belief in the peace process in relation to the 
U.S. interests, Thrall (2017, 196-206) suggested that the American officials involved 
in the Peace Process could be divided into three groups:  
 
i. Skeptics: the smallest group, which comprises conservatives and 
neoconservatives such as Elliot Abrams, John Bolton and Douglas Feith, who 
believe that Arabs will not agree to peace on terms acceptable to the Israeli 
center-right majority. Opposing the peace process from the start, they have 
had limited influence on the US-brokered negotiations. Even after the Bush 
Administration endorsed the establishment of the Palestinian state, they still 
opposed it. More importantly, they believe that most of the significant 
agreements between Israel and the Arabs- from the Oslo accords to the peace 
agreement with Jordan- were initiated without the US. Therefore, the US 
brokered negotiations are not only waste of time for Washington; they are 
also destabilizing and dangerous. This group tends to focus on the bottom-to-
top changes, such as promoting the project of institution’s building in the PA 
territories. Moreover, they promoted the notion of isolating Hamas and the 
other Islamist parties on the basis of fighting terrorism, as they fiercely 
backed Israel in its aggression against the Gaza strip in 2008/2009, and during 
the Lebanon war in 2006 (pp. 196-198).   
ii. Reproachers: this influential group comprises of self-described realists and 
veterans of the peace process who are critical to themselves and other officials 
for having acted as “Israel’s lawyers” in the words of Aaron David Miller. It 
includes names like George Mitchell, the officials in the US consulate in 
Jerusalem the J Street, American for Peace Now and other critical groups. 
This group believes in the possibility of achieving peace and ending conflict 
  
27 
through negotiations where they seek to play the role of “balanced” 
mediators. They tend also to think that the conflict can be resolved if the US 
were to put sufficient pressure on Israel within the limits of the US domestic 
politics (often tend to be verbal pressures). Above all, this group believes in 
the inevitability of the American role as the main mediator and broker of 
peace. Unlike the skeptics, they emphasize the urgency of Israel’s need to 
reach an agreement with the Palestinians (pp. 198-202). 
iii. Embracers: this wide and most influential group combines the skeptics’ 
unconditional support of Israel and the reproachers’ unwavering faith in the 
peace process. Like the former, they believe that the US focus on the 
settlements is mistaken. While they agree with the reproachers on the 
necessity of the US involvement in the peace process, they firmly believe, as 
do the skeptics, that peace can be only achieved by embracing Israel tightly, 
reassuring it and alleviating its fears. For them, Israel is the stronger party that 
has more to give and more to lose; so, it needs more confidence in the US to 
take generous step (pp. 202-204). In fact, the historical seeds of this group can 
be found in the logic by which Henry Kissinger invented the Peace Process, 
where he sought to secure strategic advantages for Israel during the protracted 
and incremental process of negotiations with its neighbors, Egypt and Syria 
during the 1973 war and after it. This may explain more the relative strength 
of this group, as it has always represented the procedural and incrementalist 
logic of the peace process (see Khalil 2014).    
 
Given his firm belief in peace, and his sympathetic realism, and partly his activist 
legacy, Obama was not a skeptic. According to Thrall (p. 203), when Obama entered 
the White House, he believed that Bush Administration’s Skeptics were too intimate 
to Israel, and he thought that this intimacy did not yield any practical results for the 
peace process. But certainly, he swayed between the other two groups; yet never fully 
belonged to either. In the following section, I argue that Obama at first embraced the 
critical approach of the reproachers; but when his efforts to re-launch the negotiations 
failed, he moved toward the embracers and became more unwilling to engage more 
with the conflict increasingly complicating facts on the grounds. This shift 
highlighted in his peace staff and envoys, reflected a change in the definition of the 
American national interests in relation to the conflict.  
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b. The Abortive Resumption Of The Negotiations 
 
As a president, Obama addressed the conflict early on (Miller, 2010; Thrall, 2016; 
Khalidi, 2012). It was Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority, 
one of the first foreign leaders Obama called in his first day in the White House. This 
made some Palestinian officials to think that “[he] is so serious about the Palestinian 
problem” (Thrall, 2016). Convinced by the possibility of enforcing the two state 
solutions, on his second day, Obama appointed Senator George Mitchell as the US 
The US Middle East peace envoy in January 2009 (CNN, 2009). The choice of 
Mitchell was very promising given Mitchell’s instrumental role in the Good Friday 
Agreement that achieved peace in Northern Ireland, and his authorship of the fact-
finding report in April 2001, The Mitchell Report, which recommended a freeze on 
the Israeli settlement construction in 2001 (Ruebner, 2016; Khalidi, 2013, p. 97).  In 
addition to Mitchell, Obama filled his Administration with “peace believer” figures 
such as the chief of staff Rahm Emanuel and the secretary of state Hilary Clinton and 
his national security advisor James L. Jones, a former Middle East envoy, who had 
announced that: “If there was one problem that I would recommend the president [to 
solve], this would be it” (Miller, 2010, 52).        
 
Moreover, during a meeting with Mahmoud Abbas the PA President in May 
2009, Obama promised that “the establishment of a Palestinian state is a must for me 
personally,” according to meeting minutes leaked to Al Jazeera. This allegedly 
changed atmosphere, which led the PA’s lead negotiator to claim, “In an expeditious 
manner, we will get to the two-state solution,” he maintained, “The Washington I 
went to last week isn’t the Washington I knew before.” (Ruebner, 2016) Most 
importantly, after the same meeting, the Administration called for a complete freeze 
in the Israeli settlement building in the West Bank and Jerusalem. Nevertheless, it was 
clear that Obama's good offices were to hit the inconvenient changes of politics in the 
region. In April 2009, a new right-wing government was elected in Israel and headed 
by Benjamin Netanyahu, whose role determined a good deal of Obama's policy 
toward the conflict. 
 
For some observers (Feldman and Shikaki, 2009; Scham, 2014) it was not a 
well spotted bet by Obama’s Administration to start its intervention with demand on 
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freezing the settlement’s building as a precondition for re-launching the negations 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis. On one hand, it was difficult for the newly 
elected Israeli government to accept this condition as it was heavily based on the 
settlers' parties (Scham, 2014). On the other hand, by setting the freeze call as a 
precondition, Obama's Administration turned it from a confidence-building measure 
required for launching the negotiations' process into an integral part of the process 
without putting it into a larger strategy of the conflict resolution (Feldman and 
Shikaki, 2009). According to Menenberg, (2011, p. 29) Obama’s preconditions 
backlashed as they created more gaps between the two concerned parties.       
 
Whatever the first mistakes of the Obama Administration, it was clear that it 
could not remain adherent to the freeze demand. Thereby, it surrendered in September 
2009 while pressuring the Palestinians to accept the conditions for resuming the 
process of negotiations:  “Firstly, during the talks Israel could continue building new 
settlements in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Secondly, while Israel 
violated international law the Palestinians had to refrain from peacefully employing it, 
including by exercising their lawful right to join multilateral institutions, which, 
unlike Israel’s settlement activity, the US said it would consider an act of “bad faith” 
(Thrall, 2014). 
 
The swinging pressures did not lead to advancement in the process as the 
divisions were being hardened on both sides and the initial period turned into a waste 
of time of mutual disappointments. While a slow progress was being made, 
Netanyahu further complicated the process. In order to preempt the Palestinians call 
for the right to return, he demanded on their acceptance to the Jewishness of Israel as 
a precondition for negotiations, downplaying his earlier scheme of the economic 
peace in the West Bank. 
 
Finally, this stalemate led to Mitchell’s resignation as Obama’s special envoy 
in May 2018. While it was Mitchell’s personal request, it was evident that the 
Netanyahu attitude towards the attempt to revive the peace process caused his 
resignation. According to Avi Shlaim (2016), unlike Northern Ireland, where both 
parties remained committed to the success of the peace process, Netanyahu regarded 
peace as an American interest, not an Israeli one. Therefore, he did his best to turn 
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this American-led peace process into a charade, which Mitchell clearly did not want 
to be a part of. Moreover, the regional instability following the popular uprisings, the 
explosion of other conflicts, civil wars and armed struggles all over the Arab world 
exposed the vulnerability of the American Middle Eastern policy and complicated the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
 
Netanyahu was not the only one who threw obstacles in Mitchell’s way. 
According to Khalidi (2013, pp. 107-110) some obstacles came from within the 
Administration and Washington politics, which undermined Mitchel’s mission for 
peace. Firstly, the absence of the congressional endorsement of his approach 
regarding Hamas and the settlement freeze. The Capitol Hill did not embrace the 
settlement freeze, and Mitchel could not gain the support of his colleagues for softer 
conditions to engage Hamas into the negotiations. He was told that his proposal is a 
nonstarter. Moreover, Mitchel was a victim of a prolonged bureaucratic mugging by 
another “peace process” pro-Israel operative. This was no one other than Dennis 
Ross. Appointed in the National Security Council (NSC) by Obama as a reward for 
his efforts in securing the Jewish votes of the swing states, Ross advocated “pre-
emptive acceptance of to what he described as the [Netanyahu] coalition’s red lines.” 
i.e. the unity of his settler government’s coalition, in other words the continuation of 
settlement expansion.        
 
In Thrall’s terms, the pressure imposed by Ross, and accepted by Obama, 
pushed the Administration from the position of the reproachers to that of the 
embracers. This was obvious when Ross, who triumphed over Mitchel, got complete 
dealings with the Israeli government, and reportedly made, in fall 2010, it an 
extraordinary offer that included twenty F-35 stealth fighters, a US veto of a planned 
UNSC resolution on Palestinian statehood, in exchange for three months settlement 
freeze that would not apply to the entire Jerusalem. According to the former US 
ambassador and peace process veteran Daniel Kurtzer that was unprecedented US 
move since “previously US opposition to settlements resulted in penalties, not 
rewards.” (Kurtzer, 2010) Endorsed by Obama, the offer was rejected by Netanyahu, 
whereas the number of tenders issued for new housing in East Jerusalem quadrupled 
(Thrall, 2017, p. 201).   
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c. Obama Embraces the Israeli Narrative  
Upon a visit paid by the US Vice President Joe Biden to Israel in May 2010, the 
Israeli government announced a major settlement expansion in East Jerusalem. For 
Ruebner (2016, p. 51), this decision was a deliberate hit from Netanyahu to Obama. 
And for Miller (2010, p. 53), it signified that Obama was helpless and lacked a robust 
strategy on pushing Israel to peace. In fact, it was Netanyahu’s triumph, which 
asserted a loss of hope for peace among the Administration, where the “peace 
believers” especially the reproachers started succumbing to the deeply rooted 
structures of the American politics regarding the conflict. This reflected in more 
center leaning rhetoric, and perception. Gradually, Obama dropped the urgency of 
freezing the settlement and the necessity of the Palestinian statehood in favor of the 
emphasis of the existential threats Israel faced in the Middle East (Khalidi 2013, 90).  
In a speech delivered before the UN General Assembly in September 2011, 
Obama asserted, “Israel is surrounded by neighbors that have waged repeated wars 
against it.” In reference to its geopolitical vulnerability and the hostile neighbors, he 
stated “leaders of much larger nations threaten to wipe it off of the map.” Moreover, 
Obama associated this situation to the historic persecution to the Jewish people that 
culminated in the Holocaust (see Obama speech 2011). This theme was repeated in a 
striking manner during his speech to AIPAC in March 2012, where he used the 
evocative words and emotional words “Israel’s destruction” twice in one paragraph. 
According to Khalidi (2013, p. 91), this signified a complete acceptance of the Zionist 
narrative of the conflict in the region. Nevertheless, it was not an unexpected 
transformation, since we can trace the seeds of this perception in Obama’s previous 
speeches. It became clear that the peace process was no longer balanced, but USA 
was adamant to achieve it according to its vision. 
A central notion of this slightly new discourse was countering what had been 
called ‘delegitimization of Israel.’ This term refers to, according to several Israel 
advocacy groups, [“negating] the right of the Jewish people to live in a sovereign 
democratic and Jewish state in the historical homeland of the Jewish people, modern 
day Israel” (The Jewish Federations, no date). In fact, it extends to cover any criticism 
directed against the state of Israel on the basis of international law, such as its 
occupation of the West Banks and other Arab territories since 1967, its besiege 
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against Gaza strip and turning it into the biggest prison in the world and the violations 
of the human rights of millions of Palestinians living under occupation. According to 
Khalidi (2013, p.97), this term stems from the assumption that these actions, and 
others, are “legitimate” in the international law.  
In his interview with the Atlantic’ Jeffery Goldberg in March 2012, Obama 
highlighted his military and diplomatic support to Israel on many levels such 
as “ensuring that Israel maintains its qualitative military edge, fighting back against 
delegitimization of Israel, whether at the [UN] Human Rights Council, or in front of 
the UN General Assembly, or during the Goldstone Report, or after the flare-up 
involving the flotilla [Mavi Marmara incident in May 2010]” (Goldberg, 2012).  
 
Ironically, these efforts extended to include the Obama Administration’s 
rejection of any attempt to promote the Palestinian rights in the international forums, 
even symbolically. For the Administration, this was a catastrophic setback of the 
already halted peace talk, and an attempt to “delegitimize Israel,” so it intervened to 
prevent it (Ruebner, 2016, p. 57). The glaring example of this policy was when the 
Administration mobilized its full resources to quash the PA’s bid for statehood 
recognition and full membership in the UN. Obama castigated openly the Palestinians 
for their bid saying, in a speech delivered to the UN General Assembly, that they were 
using the wrong forums, as UN resolutions and statements could not achieve peace, 
which could only be reached through negotiations (Cooper, 2011). Later, in an 
AIPAC conference, he asserted, “No vote at the United Nations will ever create an 
independent Palestinian state.” 
 
 The Administration spared no effort during a full year to assure that Palestine 
would not become a full member of the UN. According to Wendy Sherman, 
undersecretary of state for political affairs, the Administration was doing a very broad 
and very vigorous demarche,” against the Palestinian membership in the UN, “of 
virtually every capital in the world [and] that this is high on the agenda for every 
meeting the secretary has with every world leader” (Rogin, 2011).  However, the PA 
applied for statehood status. Its request languished in the UN Security Council’s 
committee because of the US rejection. As a consolation, the UN General Assembly 
granted Palestine the status of permanent non-Observer in November 2012. The 
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resolution passed by 138 in favor, 9 against and 41 abstentions. The U.S. was among 
the opposing votes, besides Israel (UN GA/11317).  
Even these capitulations were not sufficient for the Jewish lobby and the 
hawkish republicans who fiercely attacked Obama’s approach regarding Israel/ 
Palestine. When the 2012 elections approached, the republican candidate Mitt 
Romney said that Obama “threw Israel under the bus,” and asked about the policy he 
would conduct on the conflict, he replied “You could just look at the things the 
president (Barack Obama) has done and do the opposite” (Cited in Ruebner, 2016 p. 
53).  In fact, doing the opposite was stripping Israel from the unprecedented support 
that it had since decades; and undoing several favors the Obama Administration had 
done to Tel Aviv.   
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V. The Structural Factors 
This chapter sheds lights on the objective context in which the Administration was 
operating which presented constraints on its movement for peace. This context 
consisted  in several elements; I refer to them as structures reflecting relations, 
settings and positions. For the matter at hand, I focus on tow structures, the post-2011 
chaotic security situation in the Middle East, the aftermath of the Arab uprisings; and 
the US-Israeli relations. While the former represents foreign factor that affects the US 
position in the region, the latter reflects, to a larger extent, the interplay of the 
between domestic and foreign contexts. Furthermore, the two factors were not 
separated they converged at some points and led to downgrading  peace in Palestine 
on the American agenda for the Middle East since 2011 until the end of the Obama 
Administration.             
c. Chaotic Security Situation in the Middle East 
 
When Obama came into office in 2009, he inherited a deteriorating situation in the 
Middle East, and was willing to rebalance the U.S. commitments to the region 
(Lynch, 2015). His strategy, that was compatible with his vision as a non-
interventionist and a peacemaker with the Muslim World, aimed at completing the 
withdrawal from Iraq and achieving peace in Palestine (Jervis, 2017). Yet, the 
unprecedented changes in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings brought up 
confusion to this strategy, as the region grew into a complicated terrain of conflicts, 
and local and regional strife. The Middle East has become a more dangerous security 
environment where the costs of preserving security and keeping stability have become 
higher that the Obama Administration was not willing to pay. Therefore Obama 
turned his rebalance strategy into gradual resizing or “rightsizing” the American 
commitment to the region (Lynch, 2015). This new strategy did not mean 
disengagement with the region but reprioritizing its objectives and concerns.  
It is hard to determine whether the Obama Administration created this security 
structure, or it was only affected by it. For Lynch (2015) it was a systemic response to 
a new set of security challenges and flaws in the original vision that led Obama’s 
Middle Eastern policy. Karsh (2017), on the other hand, argues it was Obama’s 
passivity and inaction that led to more destabilizing the region, with the rise of violent 
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Islamist extremism, Iran expanded influence and collapse of peace talks in Israel/ 
Palestine. Nevertheless, this complicated situation limited the options for brokering 
peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis form several aspects:  
• Losing urgency:  in the light of turmoil in Syria, the collapse of the state 
in Libya, the civil war in Yemen, the rise of terrorist movements in Syria 
and Iraq and other calamities across the region, the Palestinian plight was 
overshadowed from the view of many parties, not only the U.S., but even 
among the Arab states and peoples. On one hand, the conflict proved to 
be less deadly than other conflict zones in the region. While these 
conflicts claimed the lives of thousands and pushed millions to 
displacement and exile, the conflict in Palestine/ Israel claimed the lives 
of few persons, except for the armed confrontations between the Israel 
and Hamas in 2012-2013 and 2014. On the other hand, unlike other 
conflicts, Palestine hardly had anything to do with other far-reaching 
repercussions such as terrorism, state collapse and regional proxy wars 
between Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Israel. Therefore, for Obama, in 
accordance with the rightsizing strategy, Palestine was not the right place 
to start and to invest diplomatic resources, although it was a constant 
item on his agenda, yet downgraded after other urgent issues.              
• Redefining national interests in the region: essential to rightsizing the 
American commitment to the region was to reduce the U.S. national 
interest in the region into security concerns, excluding conflict resolution 
or peace brokering in Palestine or anywhere else in the region. 
According to this vision, Iran nuclear program and combatting terrorist 
networks of the Islamic State (ISIS) and AlQaeda became priorities in 
which he would spend more energy and resources. For the former, 
Obama showed great interest in containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions 
through multilateral framework, for sharing benefits and risks with other 
stakeholders. According to Lynch (2015), the Iran deal or the JCPOA, 
reached in 2015 between Iran and the 5+1 group, was an example of 
success where priorities were outlined, resources were allocated and 
outcome was achieved. More strikingly, Obama was willing to defy the 
pressures pursued by the Netanyahu government, the hawkish lobby and 
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his Arab allies who wanted harsh actions against Iran. As for terrorism in 
the Middle East, the Obama Administration in 2014 led an international 
coalition of regional and international powers to fight ISIS in Syria and 
Iraq. This coalition was effective in liberating the northern Iraq from the 
terrorist group by the end of 2017. This willingness to allocate resource 
for achieving specific goals was not missing in dealing with the peace 
process in Palestine/ Israel, as the conflict did not fit Administration of 
national interest’s modified rubric after the 2011 unrests.     
• Losing natural allies: as Scham (2014) puts it, against the unprecedented 
complexity, it was very hard for the United States to find a "good guy" to 
rely on in resolving the conflict "but currently every potential "good guy" 
is allied with some "bad guys." Furthermore, one might add that the 
regime change in Egypt that ousted Mubarak in 2011 made the US peace 
more difficult. Mubarak, in spite of his regime undemocratic vices, was 
an experienced broker from the beginning of the Peace process in Madrid 
in 1991. The successive regimes following the Egyptian uprisings had 
complicated relations with the US and were not interested in exerting so 
much effort in any regional crises including Palestine. The other former 
"good guys" in the region especially Turkey and Saudi Arabia found in 
the US abandonment of the hegemonic behavior under Obama a historic 
chance to manipulate the conflicts in Syria, Libya, Yemen and instability 
in Egypt. peace in Palestine has not been a project to pay off for them.  
• Losing belief in peace: According to Ross and Jeffery (2013, p. 27), the 
unrests in the region make both Israelis and Palestinians reluctant to take 
risks for peace. They deepened the crux of the stalemate, which is the 
mistrust between the two parties. Theoretically, this could be true, given 
the magnitude of uncertainty and hostility, induced by the conflictual 
environment. Yet, this analysis neglects that role of the domestic politics 
of each party in minimizing the possibilities of peace. In fact, the 
makeup of the Netanyahu movement, the settler movements behind it, 
and the Palestinian chronic divide between Hamas and Fatah have been 
crucial in throwing more hurdles in the way for peace.  
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Facing all these major changes, Obama, who had turned into a realist, at least 
when it come to the Middle East politics, lost a great deal of his personal and political 
interest in brokering the peace in Palestine/ Israel. As he was at deep odds with his 
Administration on the strategic options for managing the conflict in Syria, Libya and 
other places, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict lost its relevance to his Middle Eastern 
vision and agenda.    
d. The U.S.- Israeli Relationship 
 
In dealing with the American Israeli relationships, Obama was between a rock and a 
hard place. Obama came to office against the background of extraordinary pro-Israeli 
policies during the Bush Administration (Khalidi, 2013, p. 104). As we have seen, 
Obama succumbed to this fact, even before being a president, and he emphasized 
more than once on the solidness of the bonds between the Washington and Tel Aviv. 
This change was more obvious in the diplomatic support Israel gained at the expense 
of the Palestinian and the peace process. Israel was not only diplomatically satisfied 
with the Obama Administration; it was pleased with the unprecedented military 
support it gained from Obama. As Avi Shlaim (2017) put it, Obama fully lived up to 
America’s formal commitment to preserve Israel’s “qualitative military edge” by 
supplying his ally with ever more sophisticated weapons systems. His aid was a 
staggering military package of $38bn for the next 10 years. This represents an 
increase from $3.1 to $3.8bn per annum. It was also the largest military aid package 
from one country to another in the annals of human history.   
The Irony is that this unwavering support to Israel was going against a 
background of nonworking chemistry between Obama and the Israel Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu. It was a fact that any of them did not try to hide it. For 
example, in the 2012 presidential elections, it was clear that Obama was not 
Netanyahu's best White House resident, so he supported the Republican candidate 
Mitt Romney and did his best to mobilize the Jewish lobby to have Obama out 
(Pfeffer, 2012). Obama, on his side, showed how bad was his relation with 
Netanyahu. For example, on the sidelines of a G-20 meeting in Paris in 2011, the 
former French president Nicolas Sarkozy reportedly described Netanyahu as a liar, 
and Obama replied by saying: "You're sick of him -- but I have to deal with him every 
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day" (Smith, 2011). A year later, in his interview with the Atlantic, Obama alluded to 
the divergence in perception between himself and Netanyahu. “I think it is absolutely 
true,” Obama said “that the prime minister and I come out of different political 
traditions. This is one of the few times in the history of U.S.-Israeli relations where 
you have a government from the right in Israel at the same time you have a center-left 
government in the United States” (Goldberg, 2012). Furthermore, it was Obama’s 
coolness, even when he was supporting Israel rhetorically, that brought him under the 
fire criticism from Netanyahu and his American allies within the lobby and the 
hawkish republicans (Khalidi, 2013, p. 98).  
Yet, it was the deep-rooted structure of the relations between the two allies, 
not the personalities that can explain this unprecedented support from Obama to 
Israel. The elements of this structure can be explained as follow:  
• Strategic partnership: Israel is not only the beneficiary of its alliance with 
the United States, the latter also benefits substantially from this 
relationship (Blackwell and Gordon, 2016, 15). When it comes to the 
security concern, Israel is the closest ally of the U.S. in the world’s most 
unstable region; it shares valuable intelligence with Washington on 
terrorism, proliferation and regional politics. Moreover, the U.S. draws 
very important military advantages from this alliance in fields like 
military technology, intelligence and cyber security. Economically, 
despite its small size and population, Israel is the largest regional investor 
in the U.S., and an important research and development partner for the 
American high-tech sector and a source of innovative ideas and 
experimenting the challenges of the 21st century such as renewable energy 
and water and food security (Ibid, 15). 
• Colonial “metropole”: the similarities between the origins of the 
American and Israeli societies as colonial enterprises have long been 
discussed. In spite of the huge changes in both societies they have not lost 
their significance. According to Khalidi (2013, 102), the United States 
had become over years in some respects a metropole for the Israeli 
settlement enterprise in the West Bank. This is obvious in terms of the 
generous and tax-deduced private American funding of settlements and 
the constant movement from the U.S. to Israel of religious nationalist 
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settlers, most of them aggressive and fanatical to live in these settlements 
and outposts. This situation created an organic relationship between large 
parts of the Israeli society and politics and their counterparts in the U.S. 
This organic relation between Israel and large swathes of the American 
society can also be explained by the effect of the evangelical white right, 
where this conservative sect see Israel through the prism of 
fundamentalist interpretation of the bible, as the Holy Land belong only 
to the modern Israelis, as it belonged before to the Israelites of the Old 
Testament (see Weber 1998). The influence of these groups was clear 
during the Bush Administration, and did wane during its successor, 
especially among the white middle class. Accordingly, addressing the 
U.S. Israeli relationships’ concerns are to touch on domestic politics.  
• The power of the Lobby: it is a backbone of this structure, to which 
Obama capitulated once moved to the national politics (see Abunimah, 
2007; Khalidi, 2013). But it was not only about the electoral politics and 
its complexities in the U.S., the Israeli lobby is a part of the foreign policy 
institutions outside the official establishment. From his side, as a 
democrat, Obama was keen on keeping the Jewish community's support 
to the Democratic Party, and he made it to the White House again in 
2012, avoiding any provocative talk on just and permanent peace or the 
illegitimacy of Israeli settlements. This is not saying that the lobby factor 
was the only determinant in Obama's change of heart regarding Palestine. 
It is a contributing factor in the dynamics of American domestic and 
foreign policies. Even though, this factor has undergone structural shifts 
in the last years and become more complicated. Recently, the Jewish 
community in the US has grown more divided over Israel (Sasch, 2014). 
The organized Jewish lobby has no longer become the only voice 
speaking for the American Jewry as other social movements challenging 
its monopoly notably the J Street and American for Peace Now (APN) 
that are condemning Israel hawkish policies. Although these alternative 
voice groups are still much smaller than AIPAC, their activism reflects 
increasing changes in the traditional lobby politics regarding the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict (Balckwill and Gordon 2016, 19). Martin Indyk 
(Rothkoff, 2014) suggested that these changes ushered generational 
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changes in the American Society where the younger generation had 
grown less supportive of Israel that is moving under the Likud leadership 
towards more ultra-religious nationalism.   
 
Even these changes did not alter the effect of this structure on the choices of the 
Obama Administration regarding the peace process. It was hard for the 
Administration to defy the pressures from within and from the Netanyahu 
government, as it was attending for other items on its Middle Eastern agenda that had 
been defined by the first factor. In fact, one might argue that between 2012 and 2015, 
the Obama traded the peace in Palestine with the nuclear deal with Iran. While it 
managed to gain the support of the large part of the establishment, particularly in the 
congress, it avoided further pressures form the Netanyahu government by dropping 
the push of peace in Palestine.  
In fact, Obama’s success to avoid the Lobby, and Netanyahu pressures, in the Iran 
deal, while failing to do so when it came to Palestine, can be explained by the very 
different approaches he chose from the beginning to handle each of them. In Iran, 
Obama chose to be internationalist, pursuing multilateral diplomacy where other 
international powers were involved in the negotiations. It was, therefore, easier for 
him to highlight the legitimacy of the agreement and to ease the pressure form within. 
On the contrary, dealing with peace in Palestine, Obama and his administration 
preferred to pursue the traditional monopoly on the cause, which is one of the pillars 
of the peace process creed, and did not try to invite other players to help, and showed 
no enthusiasm for non-American initiatives, consider the French peace initiative in 
the Middle East in June 2016. Consequently, the American diplomacy in Palestine 
remained under the spell of the domestic legitimacy not the legitimacy of the 
international community.   
In the following chapter, the study shall tackle the last attempts made by the 
Administration regarding the conflict against the background of the changes of 
perceptions and the exigencies and changes of the structures. 
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VI. Obama’s “too little, too late” legacy 
a. Kerry’s warmed over diplomacy 
By the beginning of his second term, Obama seemingly did not lose his belief in the 
possibility for peace. Nevertheless, he evidently lost his enthusiasm for it. In fact, the 
Administration reshuffle renewed the hopes for peace in Palestine/Israel.  The 
appointment of Sen. John Kerry as Secretary of State heralded a fresh start for the 
talk. To assist Kerry in his new mission, Obama appointed the veteran former 
ambassador to Tel Aviv Martin Indyk in July 2013. At the beginning, the confluence 
of both Kerry's sense of responsibility and Indyk’s expertise suggested the possibility 
of reaching a reasonable compromise. For Thrall (2017, p. 203), this appointment 
indicated Obama’s complete adoption of the embracers’ total vision and methods of 
brokering peace that would not come through pursuing pressures on Israel, but 
through more seductive offers.     
However, the efforts of the new peace team worked for a while. Longer and 
more intensive peace talks resumed in the summer of 2013 until April 2014. In fact, 
this round was the most intensive U.S.-mediated Israeli-Palestinian negotiations since 
the Clinton Administration (Ruebner, 2016, 55). The team, especially Kerry, showed 
a great belief in peace through protracted negotiation, so that Thrall (2017, 190-209) 
called their efforts a faith-based diplomacy, whereas the Economist (January 2014) 
described it as methodical midwifery. “Kerry,” according to Shlaim (2016) 
“demonstrated the courage of his convictions, and he displayed astonishing energy in 
pursuit of a breakthrough. In his first year as secretary of state, he paid no less than 
eleven visits to the region.”  
It was not a lack of faith, therefore, that led to the failure of these sincere 
efforts. From one side, Kerry deeply believed that, unlike other insoluble conflicts in 
the Middle East, a resolution to this conflict is achievable. For him, decades of efforts 
failed in achieving peace, not because of the irresponsible positions of both parties, 
but mainly because they did not trust each other. His panacea to this chronic case was 
making promises to both parties, yet inconsistent and contradicting promises. He told 
the Israelis that the Palestinians would join the talks in exchange for the release of 
prisoners without insistence on the settlement freeze. He gave the Palestinians a letter 
affirming the final goal of the U.S. was to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 
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borders. While, he confirmed to the Israelis that the Palestinian would halt any step to 
join any international organization or treaty, he promised the Palestinians with the 
priority of discussion borders and security before any other issue (see Thrall 2017, 
191-193).                 
Moreover, Kerry’s proposal’s outline was problematic and biased. In fact, it 
was warmed over of former failed peace initiatives (Ruebner, p. 55). This proposal 
included that between 75 and 80 percent of Israel’s settler population would be 
annexed to Israel in settlements blocs. While the proposal denied the Palestinians’ the 
right to sovereignty in Jerusalem, it talked about “Palestinian aspirations” for a capital 
in the holy city (Thrall, 2017, p. 203). Palestinians, also, would not have any 
sovereignty rights in the West Bank’s borders with Jordan, as joint U.S. and Israeli 
forces would rule this region. It was remarkable also that the proposal ignored any 
discussion about the future situation of the Gaza strip. During the prolonged 
negotiations, Netanyahu, through the American team reintroduced his constant 
demand of the Palestinian recognition of Israel as a state of the Jewish people (See 
Ruebner, 2016, 55). This was in exchange for a proposed $4 billion investment into 
the Palestinian economy to address rampant unemployment and sluggish economic 
growth in the Occupied Territories (MEPC, 2013). This inconsistent offer resonated 
the notion of economic peace that was mainly promoted by the left-wing Israeli 
governments and U.S. neo-conservative peace operatives.              
Failure, therefore, was embedded in the very logic of this initiative. Kerry was 
not an impartial mediator, he did his best to meet Netanyahu’s demands, avoiding 
pushing Israel to any choice that might break up his coalition (Thrall 2017, p. 203). 
For example, when Israel, against Kerry’s trust-building measures, put forward plans 
for extensive settlement expansion for each Palestinian prisoner released, Kerry did 
no more than describe this expansion as “unhelpful” and “illegitimate,” while 
justifying the sharp rise of the settlement during the negotiations as “expected,” 
urging the Palestinians not to abandon the talks (Ibid).  Palestinians, therefore, were 
not left with other choices but to leave the talks, as they realized the risk involved in 
accepting Kerry’s offers.  Mahmoud Abbas accused the United States of bending over 
backwards to appease Netanyahu and that this process would not lead to a peace 
agreement (Pressman, 2016).  
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But for Indyk (2014), both parties the Palestinians and the Israelis are to be 
blamed for the failure. In a speech delivered shortly before his resignation, to the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Indyk pointed out that "It is easier for the 
Palestinians to sign conventions and appeal to international bodies in their supposed 
pursuit of 'justice' and their 'rights.'”  a process, he argued, goes against the logic of 
negotiations’ compromise. Also,  “It is easier for Israeli politicians,” he maintained, 
“to avoid tension in the governing coalition and for the Israeli people to maintain the 
current comfortable status quo" (Indyk, 2014). Whereas this speech placed the blame 
on both parties, it denied the Palestinians any alternative strategy to seek their rights. 
For Ruebner (2016, 55), this showed how far the Obama Administration had deviated 
from its initial goal of establishing a Palestinian state in an “expeditious manner.”           
Even though Kerry’s peace proposal was so appeasing for the Israelis, he, and 
Indyk, was not immune from the Israeli criticisms. For example, Israel’s defense 
minister Moshe Ya’lon accused Kerry of having an "incomprehensible obsession" 
with his push for Middle East peace (Aljazeera, January 2014). On his side, 
Netanyahu reportedly said that he would not work again with Indyk as the latter 
placed disproportionate blame on Israel for the collapse of the peace talks (the Times 
of Israel, 2014).          
Partially as a response to the collapse of peace talks, the two major Palestinian 
factions (Hamas and Fatah) agreed to reconcile for forming a national unity 
government in April 2014. The act that Israel strongly opposed, and used to justify the 
failure of the negotiations and to condemn Abbas government (Beck 2014, 4). To 
place more pressures on the Palestinian parties in both the West Bank and Gaza, Israel 
found in the killing of three Israeli civilians and a Palestinian attacker in Hebron a 
pretext to wage another war against Hamas. This third armed conflict between Hamas 
and Israel lasted between 8July and 26 August 2014 (Sasch, 2014; Pressman 2016). 
The punitive aggression against Gaza was a practical message to prove the end 
of the talks. But, it also exposed another dimension in the American peace policy 
under Obama, it has become full of contradictions. The Administration showed a 
conventional support to Israel in its massive retaliation that led to the deaths of more 
than 2,100 Palestinians in Gaza (Norman, 2016). Not only did Obama assert Israel’s 
right to self-defense without reservations, but the US also continued to resupply the 
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Israeli military with ammunition. Also, during the war, the Congress signed off on 
$225 million in aid for Israel to enhance its Iron Dome missile defense system 
(Everett, 2014).  
b. UNSC 2334 Resolution: A Desperate Move 
The UNSC resolution 2334 could be the final major act for Obama Administration on 
the stage of the conflict. Indeed, the US abstention from the vote played a decisive 
role in the adoption of the proposal with the approval of the rest of the UNSC 
members. However, to consider this resolution as an achievement in Obama’s record 
is a controversial matter. Whereas the abstention carries some positive meaning by 
affirming international law as the solid framework of reference for resolving the 
conflict, starting with the implacable issue of settlements, the US official stance, as 
appears from its UN representative’s statement, distances itself from the resolution 
and acts half-heartedly. Moreover, by this act, Obama as showing the US adherence 
to its long stance regarding the settlement policy, also aimed at disquieting both 
Trump and Netanyahu for several reasons, part of them related to Palestine issues.  
The proposal on settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem was put forward 
by New Zealand, Malaysia, Venezuela and Senegal; a day after Egypt delayed it 
under pressure from Israel and US President-elect Donald Trump (Mada Masr 2016). 
It passed by a vote of 14-0, with the US abstaining (Aljazeera, 2016). The resolution 
came out in accordance with the UN stance as several UN member states already 
contend Israeli settlements violate the Fourth Geneva Convention's rules for 
administering occupied territory (Bloomberg, 2016). 
By adopting the resolution, the UNSC reiterated its demand that Israel ceases 
all settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territories immediately and 
completely, including East Jerusalem. It underlined that it would not recognize any 
changes to the 4 June 1967 lines, including about Jerusalem, other than those agreed 
by the two sides through negotiations. Moreover, the Council called for immediate 
steps to prevent all acts of violence against civilians, including acts of terror, as well 
as all acts of provocation and destruction. Finally, the Council called on sides to 
observe calm and restraint, refrain from provocative actions, and continues to exert 
collective efforts to launch credible negotiations on all final-status issues in the 
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Middle East peace process, within the time frame specified by the Middle East 
Quartet. (UN, SC/12657, 2016).   
The resolution came out as a balanced act based on international law 
principles, as it equally addresses settlements and terrorist violence. However, the 
Israeli reaction was, as expected, the repudiation of the resolution as a “shameful anti-
Israel resolution at the U.N. [Israeli] will not abide by its term,”, said Netanyahu in an 
instant statement. Also, his government immediately started a diplomatic retaliation 
scheme against the states that proposed the resolution, New Zealand and Senegal in 
particular (The New York Times, 23 December 2016). 
The Israeli position was backed by the then-president-elect Donald Trump 
who had previously intervened to convince the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-
Sisi to withdraw the proposal put forward by the Egyptian delegation to the UNSC. 
Trump also criticized Obama and his Administration for the abstention, promising 
that things will change in favor of Israel and the US after his inauguration. Likewise, 
several senators and congressmen rebuked the Obama's Administration stance, saying 
that it should have vetoed the resolution (The New York Times, December 2016; 
Aljazeera, December 2016). However, the Administration stance and the resolution 
itself was welcomed by some new Jewish activist groups such as the J Street group 
which stated that the resolution “is consistent with longstanding bipartisan American 
policy, which includes strong support for the two-state solution, and clear opposition 
to irresponsible and damaging actions, including Palestinian incitement and terror and 
Israeli settlement expansion and home demolitions.” (J Street, 2016).  
In her speech to the UNSC, Samantha Power, the US Permanent 
Representative to the UN, justified the balanced stance of the US regarding the 
resolution. Clarifying the reasons for the US abstention, Power thought that the 
resolution is a part of the UN general unbalanced attitude concerning Israel, 
criticizing it harshly in comparison to other states and cases, and ignoring the 
terrorism it is facing. However, the resolution, Power argued, is reflecting the facts on 
the ground where the "settlement problem has gotten so much worse that it is now 
putting at risk the very viability of that two-state solution". Therefore, the abstention, 
Power emphasized, is part of the constant formal American stance regarding the 
settlement as an illegal practice of occupation, and it is consistent with the attitude of 
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the former American Administrations since the 1960s. Power also criticized 
Netanyahu for having described his government as “more committed to settlements 
than any in Israel’s history”; while she condemned the PA for not taking real 
measures to stop the terrorist attacks against Israel and its citizens (Power, 2016).  
Typically, Power’s statement was reflecting the official standpoint of Obama's 
Administration. The US abstention was decisive in having the resolution passed. 
However, the Administration acted as a "free rider" with the resolution. As a matter of 
fact, it did not participate in drafting it, and the proposal was not on the table of the 
discussion between Kerry and Suzan Rice, the National Security Advisor, in their 
meeting with the Palestinian officials in mid-December (Bercovici, 2017). While the 
concerned members state, Egypt at the beginning and New Zealand, Senegal, 
Venezuela and Malaysia, acted on their own; the Administration did not intervene in 
their discussions. So, Obama’s Administration kept its hands clean, but the resolution 
was an opportunity not to be missed to improve its record and to disturb its 
adversaries, especially Netanyahu and Trump.  
So far, there have been several interpretations for Obama’s last move. 
Nevertheless, the motivations for Obama's late and desperate move can be explained 
by the following:  
1. Obama's Administration had grown more concerned about the impact on 
settlements of the two-state solution as the essential tool for the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict resolution. As Power explained in her speech, in 2011, the 
United States vetoed a resolution that focused exclusively on settlements, 
because it dealt with the settlements as if they were they only factor harming 
the prospects of a two-state solution. But the circumstances have changed 
dramatically. Since 2011, settlement growth has only accelerated. And 
according to the report of the Middle East Quartet in July 2016, there had been 
a concern about the systematic process of land seizures, settlement 
expansions, and legalizations whereas Israel has been advancing its plans for 
more than 2,600 new settlement units (Power, 2016).  So, having a UNSC 
resolution concerning the settlements passed is an American 
acknowledgement of the danger posed by the Israeli occupation policy to the 
peace process and its future.        
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2. The Administration had a profound sense of disappointment towards 
Netanyahu for his disturbing attitude in defying all the previous attempts to 
reach a resolution to the conflict, propagating against the nuclear deal inside 
the US, and endorsing Trump, and Mitt Romney before in the 2012 elections. 
So, the UNSC 2334 was an attempt to press a sensitive nerve of the Israeli 
government without using an American blade, but an international one; the 
international law, provided the international community's consistent stance 
against the settlements. In few words, Obama’s abstention was a symbolic 
punishment to Netanyahu’s arrogance. However, Obama was sure that Trump 
is close enough to Netanyahu to heal his wounded pride.   
3. The Obama Administration's abstention can be seen as a means of reducing 
the damage that could be done by the upcoming Trump presidency, provided 
the widely held view that Trump may end up undoing decades of standing US 
policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (ACRPS, 2017). Therefore, if 
Trump tries to match his annoying statements with internationally condemned 
actions, through the UNSC; he might be constrained with the UNSC 2334 
resolution. 
4. Finally, believing in the creed of the two-state solution, the Obama 
Administration worried that the window of opportunity for a two-state 
solution might soon close. Given the facts of the Israeli government creeping 
towards a situation of permanent occupation, and the one-state solution is 
developing on the ground whereas Israel is governing not only the Palestinians 
of Israeli citizenship but the close to five million Palestinians who live in the 
Occupied Territories. As Kerry's December 28 speech made a direct allusion 
to the possibility that if Israeli settlement expansion is not suspended, "a future 
Israeli government would face the prospect of a wide-scale civil rights 
movement demanding equal voting rights for Palestinian in the West Bank"  
(ACRPS, 2017). Thus, the resolution was the last opportunity to confirm the 
belief in the centrality of the two-state solution.  
Whatever, the motivations of Obama's abstention, it was not a significant change 
in the Administration's inactiveness. As Aronson (2016) put it "that moment is 
destined to pass. US support for the vote would not, in and of itself, have been a game 
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changer. Remember the Clinton parameters, an inexact, but far more prescriptive, a 
policy that fell from the tree almost as soon as it was ripe." 
For adding some final items to its record, the Obama Administration took the last 
two symbolic actions: Kerry’s bases of the solution and the financial transfer to the 
PA. 
Following the debate over the UNSC 2334 resolution, on 28 December 2016, 
Secretary of State Kerry gave a speech in which he outlined a vision for peace 
between the Israelis and Palestinians. In his speech, Kerry warned against the end of 
the two-state solution because of the settler agenda that defines the future of Israel. 
The purpose of this agenda is clear “they believe in one state: Greater Israel… If the 
choice is one state, Israel can either be Jewish or democratic, it cannot be both, and it 
won't ever really be at peace" (Aljazeera, 28 December 2016).  
According to Kerry’s speech, the fundamental bases of the solution are:  
1. “Principle one; provide for secure and recognized international borders 
between Israel and a viable and contiguous Palestine negotiated based on the 
1967 lines with mutually agreed equivalent swaps.” 
2. “Principle two; fulfill the vision of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181 
of two states for two peoples, one Jewish and one Arab, with mutual 
recognition and full equal rights for all their respective citizens.” 
3. “Principle three; provide for a just, agreed, fair and realistic solution to the 
Palestinian refugee issue.” 
4. “Principal four; provide an agreed solution for Jerusalem as the internationally 
recognized capital of the two states and protect and ensure freedom of access 
to the holy sites consistent with the established status quo.” 
5. “Principle five; satisfy Israel's security needs and bring a full end, ultimately, 
to the occupation. While ensuring Israel can defend itself effectively and that 
Palestine can provide security for its people in a sovereign and non-militarized 
state..” (Kerry, 2016).   
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To a larger extent, Kerry’s principles are echoing Clinton’s parameters, and both 
are last-ditch effort to offer peace. Nonetheless, Clinton's parameters were accepted 
with some reservations from both sides, and they found their pathways into the later 
negotiations in Taba talks in January 2001 and ruined by the eruption of violence in 
the second intifada, and finally they were translated into the Bush Administration’s 
first American explicit call for an independent Palestinian state in January 2002 and in 
the Road Map in April 2003 (CFR, 2005). But with the coming of Trump 
Administration in 2017, the likelihood of enforcing Kerry's principles into diplomatic 
efforts is very low. 
After Obama had left his office on 20 January 2017, reports unveiled that he 
released $ 221 million to the PA. This sum of money was a part of aid provided by the 
US to the West Bank and Gaza and totaled about $ 355 million in 2015. However, the 
funding was frozen by a congressional act as some senators and representatives 
accused the PA of unilateral attempt at statehood, corruption, incitement of violence 
and paying salaries to people imprisoned for committing terror acts (Lockie, 2017). 
While the resale was seen as necessary support for the PA and its head Mahmoud 
Abbas who are undergoing hard times, from the side of the Israeli government and 
from within Fatah and its internal struggle, others regarded it as a strange and 
message. No matter what the interpretations of this act, it remains symbolic, if not 
confusing, and without practical implications on the ground. 
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VII. Conclusions: Implications for the Future 
In dealing with the century-long conflict in Palestine/ Israel, Obama was not that 
radical that had been thought to be. Before being the 44th of the United States, Obama 
had a balanced vision of the conflict, yet he lacked the practical sense in translating it 
into out of the box policies. Accordingly, when he assumed the office he adopted the 
same playbook that was defined by the Camp David-Madrid-Oslo framework. 
Although he was a great believer in the “peace process” and its significance for the 
American national interests in the Middle East, he was not resilient in front of the 
structures that defied his belief. By time, he gave up his balanced vision, and became 
more pro-Israeli. That was evident in his political rhetoric and diplomatic and military 
support to Tel Aviv, even during its aggressions against the sieged Gaza Strip in 2012 
and 2014. His personal disdain of the Netanyahu right wing government did not 
change this course. Rather it contributed to his Administration poor record.  
 
Obama’s initial good intentions were defeated by the turmoil in the Middle 
East, and the nature of his Administration’s relations with Israel. In fact, these 
structural changes pushed Obama from the position of sympathetic realism, where he 
balanced between the rights of the Palestinians and the need for security for Israel, to 
be more pro-Israel, accepting the Israeli narrative, dropping the stress on the rights of 
the Palestinians. By the end of his tenure, the prevalent notion among the 
Administration’s officials, including Kerry and Power was “saving Israel from itself.” 
this notion revokes the deep-seated notion of advocating Israel and protecting it, even 
from the wrong deeds in inflicted on others and on itself. This rhetoric, in which the 
rights of the Palestinians and their agonies were overshadowed,  was an emphasis on 
how far was the change in perception, compared by the promising beginning.   
 
   Yet Obama’s choices contributed to the failure of brokering peace. First, 
when peace was priority, he lacked the strategy in handling the difficulties, in 
particular the challenges that were posed by Netanyahu. That was clear in the first 
take over the settlement. Second, the lack of strategy also was manifested in his 
bureaucratic choice of the peace operatives, where most of them were pro-Israelis, 
embracers who believed that peace could only be achieved through more concessions 
to Israel and more support to its right wing government. The failures of Mitchell 
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peace mission (2009-2011) and Kerry’s negotiations (2013-2014) were natural 
products of these flaws. Obama’s final take on the conflict, the abstention that led to 
the UNSC resolution 2334, was also a manifestation of the lack of choices he had by 
the end of his tenure, and the long lack of audacity in translating visions for peace into 
solid actions.  
 
By the end of his Administration, it was clear that the American sponsored 
peace process was in a critical situation, it took only Donald Trump to prevent any 
hope of reviving it. Unlike Obama who came in with great expectations that went 
unfulfilled, Trump came against the background of great fears that have been proved 
right over year. He has shown by far unwavering support to Israel and personal 
affinity with its like-minded right wing Netanyahu government. Trump, with a great 
sense of businessman, started by confirming his ability to “get it done” as “[the 
conflict] is not as difficult as people have thought.” While he has been talking about a 
deal to end the conflict, he got closer to the same American playbook of making deals 
in the conflict. Moreover, he was confused about the nature of the deal, whether it is 
to set up one state or two states. Trump showed little enthusiasm for the two-state 
solution that has underpinned the American policy since the launching of the peace 
process in 1991. Instead, he said he is fine with the “two-state” or the “one state” 
(Landler 2017). Netanyahu, in return, has become more certain of the true friendship 
of Trump with the “Jewish State.” Some observers saw trump’s tricky language of the 
nature of the solution in his deal as an implicit declaration of the end of the “peace 
process myth” (Khalidi, 2017). 
 
The end of the peace process has become increasingly shared belief among the 
observers (see Elgindy 2017; Cohen 2017) as they have grown skeptical about 
Trump’s ambiguous ultimate deal to deliver. Yet the final deathblow was Trump’s 
declaration that the United States will recognize Jerusalem as the Capital of the state 
of Israel on 6 December 2017. The decision unleashed international outcry and 
condemnation, and caused violent protests in the occupied lands (Chacar 2017). 
Whereas it was clearly meant to satisfy Trump’s white evangelical constituency, it 
was revealing announcement with great significance to the American role in the so-
called “peace process.” In fact, it was necessary to demystify the myth.  
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The decision that will be implemented in May 2018 disqualified the United 
States as the honest broker of peace in Palestine/ Israel, as it violated international 
law. But in fact, the United States has never been that honest broker of peace; it has 
always favored the Israelis over the Palestinians, for strategic, domestic and 
sentimental reasons, even during the Obama Administration. The American 
establishment, media and large parts of the society are blinded by disdain for the 
Palestinians, denying of their rights and ignoring of their miserable situation under the 
fifty-year occupation. That was the crux of the myth that should have revealed since 
the start of the peace process. The unconditional American support of Israel made 
Netanyahu declare that no international party that the United States is qualified to 
mediate peace (Netanyahu 2018). 
 
As the peace process under the Obama Administration has shown, Washington 
was not able to force any agreement, or even to convince the involved parties of any 
of its initiatives. As Shlomo Ben Ami (2017, 41) put it “Washington gave the parties 
in the conflict the sense that American Power lacked resolve and conviction. It no 
longer intimidates, not even allies and client such as Palestinian Authority” Therefore, 
it is safe to argue that now it is the right time to introduce a new paradigm for peace in 
Palestine Israel that should be based on ending the American monopoly over the 
peace process, and to invent a new paradigm for reaching peace that goes beyond the 
domestic necessities of the domestic politics of one state, the US.  
 
This new paradigm shall take in consideration the change of the power 
balance in the world order and its implications for the region. Having said that peace 
in Palestine needs an international solution involves the United States, as it is still an 
indispensable actor in the Middle East and beyond. An international management of 
the conflict will convince the Israeli government to take more viable concessions into 
the road to peace, and the Palestinians to unite behind universally recognized peace 
initiatives. 
 
Part of that is to put to question the premises on which the American peace 
process was built, particularly the principle of “peace for land” that implies that 
controlling lands by the Israelis is justifiable so they can exchange them for peace. It 
was this implicit belief that shaped the US brokering for peace since the 1970s. In 
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fact, this principle was built on logical fallacy, since the land is quantifiable while 
peace is not. So, the new paradigm shall be based on more logical formula stress 
“peace for peace”  
       
Most importantly, a new paradigm for peace in Palestine shall emphasize the 
role of the involved parties, rather than the outsider parties, in achieving peace. Any 
plea for peace will be useless unless the Israelis and the Palestinians are willing and 
able to make concessions to the other party on just basis, and make compromise 
within each camp.      
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